

Military Diplomacy: An Essential Tool of Foreign Policy at the Theater Strategic Level

**A Monograph
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Military Diplomacy: An Essential Tool of Foreign Policy at the Theater
Strategic Level

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Abstract

Military Diplomacy: An Essential Tool of Foreign Policy at the Theater Strategic Level by Major James E. Willard, U.S. Army, 60 pages.

The driving concept behind this monograph is the thesis that not only does the military conduct diplomacy, but military diplomacy, at the combatant command level, provides a theater strategic capability essential to the effective implementation of United States foreign policy. The monograph demonstrates that this capability arises from several organizational advantages. First, the authority vested in the combatant commander facilitates the development, resourcing and execution of military diplomacy programs within a unified chain of command. Second, the combatant command contains a highly capable staff founded on historically proven structures and doctrine. Third, an extensive network of personnel and organizations positioned to coordinate and liaise across multiple levels of authority facilitates the implementation of military diplomacy activities. Finally, an unmatched pool of resources, from which to execute military diplomacy, allows for great flexibility and responsiveness when adjusting to a complex environment. The intended end-state of the monograph is to elicit two primary responses from the reader. First, that indeed the military does conduct diplomacy as part of its day-to day mission set. Second, that military diplomacy is an essential tool in facilitating the achievement of United States strategic foreign policy aims and theater strategic objectives.

The analytical methodology required to examine this topic is through qualitative analysis of primary and secondary source information. The theoretical, rather than technical, nature of the topic limits the ability to conduct a purely quantitative analysis. Theoretical and historical references provide the foundation of legitimacy for the monograph. The study of national strategic guidance, United States Pacific Command initiatives and doctrinal information establish the foreign policy development and implementation process of the United States. The examination of expert testimony and contemporary publications establish the necessity of addressing this topic in relation to current world dynamics. Finally, participation in and observation of numerous bi-lateral and multi-lateral defense conferences, subject matter expert exchanges, and international officer exchanges provide the author personal insight to the power of military diplomacy. Combining the insights garnered from this study, the monograph establishes a factual base in support of the monograph thesis. Additionally, the monograph identifies potential point(s) of friction that must be mitigated in order to effectively implement diplomatic programs, essential to influencing the contemporary environment.

Based on this study, the monograph finds that not only does United States Pacific Command conduct diplomacy, but also that military diplomacy plays an essential role in U.S. diplomatic efforts at the theater strategic level. Carrying tremendous international influence, controlling enormous resources, and capable of quickly executing a wide variety of missions, the combatant command provides an invaluable means of exporting United States foreign policy, through the use of force in times war and the use of military diplomacy in times of peace. As a foreign policy tool, the combatant command possesses expertise, resources and capabilities that no other department or agency within the United States government can bring to bear. Aligned and organized specifically for a designated geographic region, the combatant command structure is unparalleled in its capability to develop, orchestrate and execute a comprehensive, theater strategic level diplomacy program.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE.....	2
METHODOLOGY	4
KEY TERMINOLOGY.....	5
CHAPTER SUMMARY	8
MILITARY INFLUENCE: BEYOND THE VIOLENCE OF WARFARE	9
SUN TZU	10
FREDERICK AND CLAUSEWITZ.....	11
CAPTAIN ALFRED THAYER MAHAN	15
CHAPTER CONCLUSION	16
A HISTORY OF U.S. MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN THE PACIFIC	17
THE EARLY DAYS	17
WORLD WAR II- THE PINNACLE OF MILITARY DIPLOMACY	20
KOREA: THE TRUMAN-MACARTHUR INCIDENT.....	25
CHAPTER CONCLUSION	27
LEGISLATING SUCCESS: FROM PROCONSUL TO COMBATANT COMMANDER.....	28
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947	28
DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACTS OF 1958 AND 1986	32
CHAPTER CONCLUSION	34
STRATEGIC FOREIGN POLICY: SHAPING MILITARY DIPLOMACY	35
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES.....	37
SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2004-2009.....	39
NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	39
CHAPTER CONCLUSION	44
CONTEMPORARY MILITARY DIPLOMACY: UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND..	44
MITIGATING THE TURF WAR: MULTI-TIERED COORDINATION	46
THE COMBATANT COMMANDER - CHIEF DIPLOMAT OF THE PACIFIC	49
OPERATIONALIZING MILITARY DIPLOMACY	51
CHAPTER CONCLUSION	56
MONOGRAPH CONCLUSION.....	58

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Tour of the Great White Fleet, December 1907 to February 1909.	18
Figure 2: General Headquarters/Supreme Commander Allied Powers Organization Chart.	22
Figure 3: Summation of the National Security Act of 1947 and Pertinent Amendments.	29
Figure 4: Summation of the 1958 and 1986 Defense Reorganization Acts.	33
Figure 5: National Defense University Depiction of Strategic Level Interagency Process.....	42

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

On September 11, 2001, a delegation from the United States participated in a regional conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Representatives and staffers from thirty-three nations attended this United States sponsored event. The intent of the conference was to create greater cooperation amongst the nations of the Asia-Pacific by discussing contemporary issues that inhibit a mutually developmental environment. Representatives contemplated, discussed, and negotiated, in bilateral and multilateral forums, topics including economic, cultural, educational, and security related issues. Little did the delegates know that their cooperation in these matters would soon become vitally important!

With the closure of the day's business, the primary representative of each nation attended the evening's social event, an event aimed at celebrating new friendships and building relationships. A sense of accomplishment and kinship permeated the air. This atmosphere quickly turned to one of intense emotion and shock. At approximately nine o'clock in the evening, the United States delegation received word of the World Trade Center attacks and then the Pentagon attack. Naturally, as with any acquaintance, the attendees offered their condolences and expressed their outrage on a personal level. Perhaps, even more importantly, the events of September 11, 2001 illuminated, to all participants, the necessity of sustaining and improving such diplomatic forums. This conference continues in its annual tradition to this day, expanding, reinforcing, and transforming relationships that play an important role in the ongoing global war on terrorism.

What is the name of this diplomatic venue? The name is PAMS/PACC, which stands for Pacific Armies Management Seminar and Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference.¹ Yes, the conference title does include the word armies. This conference brings together the leaders of the

¹ United States Army, Pacific is the executive agent for the annual conduct of the PAMS/PACC.

armies throughout the Asia-Pacific region, to include the Chiefs of Staff of Army equivalent every second year of the conference. As stated on the official PAMS/PACC website, “by design, it is a multinational military seminar providing a forum for senior-level (lieutenant colonel to major general, or national equivalent) officers from regional ground forces to exchange views. Not only a forum to further understanding of subjects studied, but also an opportunity to establish and enhance a set of strong interpersonal relationships among the future leaders of regional armies. PAMS has proven itself as a solid contributor to the shared goal of regional stability.”²

PAMS/PACC is just one example of the diplomacy, conducted around the world every day, by the United States military. This diplomacy occurs under the auspices of the Regional Combatant Commander’s, Theater Security Cooperation (TSCP) and Theater Engagement Programs (TEP). Diplomacy by the United States military crosses the full spectrum of events to include tactical level military-to-military exercises, security assistance programs, educational and professional exchange programs, bi-lateral and multi-lateral conferences, as well as many other diplomatically inclined efforts. The goal of these programs is to shape the regional environment, influencing the conditions effecting the achievement of United States strategic foreign policy objectives.

PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE

The purpose of this monograph is examine the thesis that not only does the military conduct diplomacy, but military diplomacy, at the combatant command level, provides a theater strategic capability essential to the effective implementation of United States foreign policy. The monograph outlines the combatant command structure that facilitates military diplomacy, the organizations used to implement military diplomacy programs, and the means used to coordinate

² United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC). *Pacific Armies Management Seminar/Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference* (U.S. Army Pacific Official Webpage, accessed 25 October 2005); available from <http://www2.apan-info.net/pams/default.htm>.

these efforts across lines of executive authority. The monograph identifies potential points of friction related to the integration of such efforts into the broader diplomatic framework under the auspices of the Department of State.

Due to the brevity of the monograph, several parameters set the limits of the study. First, the military diplomacy effort of the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) establishes a geographic boundary for the study. Second, the study focuses on activities conducted in relatively permissive, peacetime environments, rather than those activities conducted in non-permissive, wartime environments. Third, assessment of only the military and diplomatic elements of national power further narrows the monographs scope.³ Finally, framing the topic are three levels of interaction, strategic (global) level, theater strategic (multilateral) level and the operational (bilateral) level, aimed at establishing the role and capability of USPACOM in conducting military diplomacy. Integrated within this framework are the multi-tiered coordination efforts required of USPACOM to achieve military diplomacy at the theater strategic level.

Consideration of four criteria illustrates the effectiveness of contemporary military diplomacy at the theater strategic level. First, the authority vested in the combatant commander facilitates the development, resourcing and execution of military diplomacy programs within a unified chain of command. Second, the combatant command contains a highly capable staff founded on historically proven structures and doctrine. This staff and the associated processes generate an ability to plan and organize that remains unmatched by departments within the executive branch of government. Third, an extensive network of personnel and organizations positioned to coordinate and liaise across multiple levels of authority facilitates the implementation of military diplomacy activities. Finally, an unmatched pool of resources, from which to execute military diplomacy, allows for great flexibility and responsiveness when

³ Elements of national power are as diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL).

adjusting to a complex environment. Using the organization and interaction of General Douglas MacArthur's occupation headquarters in Japan as a comparative model, the monograph assesses the ability of United States Pacific Command to conduct military diplomacy across the spectrum of activities identified above.

METHODOLOGY

The analytical methodology required to examine this topic is through qualitative analysis of primary and secondary source information. Qualitative analyses of historical and theoretical references, national strategic guidance, regional combatant commander initiatives, doctrinal information, expert testimony and contemporary publications, as well as the authors own professional experiences support the monograph thesis. These information sources validate the legitimacy and criticality of this topic. The theoretical, rather than technical, nature of the topic limits the ability to conduct a purely quantitative analysis. Combining the insights garnered from this study, the monograph extracts the critical point(s) of friction that must be mitigated in order to effectively implement diplomatic programs, essential to influencing the contemporary environment.

Theoretical and historical references provide the foundation of legitimacy for the monograph. Theoretically, the monograph examines writings of ancient, modern, and contemporary theorists to establish a bridge of development as to the necessity of integrating diplomatic and military activities. Historically, a case study of the cruise of the Great White Fleet, in 1908 and the United States occupation and reconstruction efforts in post World War II Japan illustrate the tremendous accomplishments achieved when elements of national power are properly coordinated and implemented.

The study of national strategic guidance, regional combatant commander initiatives and doctrinal information establish the foreign policy development and implementation process of the United States. This process significantly influences the role of diplomacy within the Department

of Defense, particularly at the theater strategic level. This review assesses the guidance provided to the Department's of State and Defense, the established role of these agencies at all levels of diplomacy, and the framework that drives the military's role in diplomacy.

The examination of expert testimony and contemporary publications establish the legitimacy and necessity of addressing this topic in relation to current world dynamics. These sources demonstrate the increasing need and expanding role of not only traditional public diplomacy, but also that of military diplomacy. In a world increasingly synonymous with globalization, diplomacy across the spectrum of national power acts as a vital enabler to the achievement of the long-term strategic aims and operational objectives.

Making no claim as an expert, the monograph author writes from a perspective of first hand experience as to the effects of military diplomacy. These experiences range from diplomatic interaction at the combatant commander level to diplomatic action at the individual action officer level. Participation in and observation of numerous bi-lateral and multi-lateral defense conferences, subject matter expert exchanges, and international officer exchanges provide the author personal insight to the power of diplomacy. It is through the compilation, analysis, and synthesis of this information that achieves a full assessment of the topic.

KEY TERMINOLOGY

To better understand the premise forwarded in the work, it is imperative the reader understand the terminology used throughout. Therefore, the following section defines these critical terms. The following definitions provide the foundation on which to build the monograph.

Policy is a course of action adopted and pursued by a government.⁴ Foreign policy refers to the course of action adopted and pursued in order to achieve a desired end state in the international environment. Foreign policy decisions shape the development and implementation of military diplomacy programs aimed at achieving foreign policy goals.

Traditional diplomacy is the conduct by government officials of negotiations and other relations between nations.⁵ “Traditional diplomacy actively engages one government with another government. In traditional diplomacy, U.S. Embassy officials represent the U.S. Government in a host country primarily by maintaining relations and conducting official USG business with the officials of the host government.”⁶ These “traditional” activities of government-to-government interface are accepted as the purview of the Department of State. The individual appointed by a government to conduct formal relations with other governments is defined as a diplomat.⁷

Public diplomacy refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, educational exchanges, radio and television.⁸ These are less formal efforts primarily focused on the civilian populations of other countries. As with formal diplomacy, authority for public diplomacy activities lies with the Department of State.

Military diplomacy is the conduct by military diplomats of negotiations and other relations between nations, nations’ militaries, and nations’ citizens aimed at influencing the

⁴ Webster’s Dictionary. *School and Office Dictionary, Second Edition* (New York: Random House, 2002), 412.

⁵ Ibid., 147.

⁶ United States Information Agency Alumni Association. *Public Diplomacy and Traditional Diplomacy* (USIA Alumni Association, accessed September 2005) available from <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org>.

⁷ Webster’s Dictionary. *School and Office Dictionary, Second Edition* (New York: Random House, 2002), 147.

⁸ United States Department of State. *Dictionary of International Relations Terms* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987).

environment in which the military operates.⁹ These efforts include both the traditional aspects of diplomacy, as well as the informal aspects of public diplomacy. The military conducts formal interchanges with other governments and their militaries, as described in the opening paragraphs. Additionally, the Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine of the United States is often the face of America when traveling abroad, in both official and non-official capacities. The associated personal interaction that occurs during these travels is a key contributor to U.S. public diplomacy efforts abroad.

Strategic level diplomacy refers to the activities of the United States government to influence the global environment. Guiding these efforts are the foreign policy aims established by the President of the United States, the National Security Council, the Department of State and the Department of Defense. The *National Security Strategy of the United States*, published by the President, the *Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan Fiscal Year 2004-2009*, and the *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* outline these aims.¹⁰

Theater strategic level diplomacy refers to the multilateral activities of the United States government to influence the regional environment. According to the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, the theater strategic environment is defined as , “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences in the theater that describes the diplomatic-military situation, affect the employment of military forces, and affect the decisions of the chain of command.”¹¹ Guiding these efforts are the regional objectives and tasks established

⁹ No doctrinal definition of Military Diplomacy exists. Author used multiple doctrinal sources and commonly accepted definitions to include the references sited in footnotes 4 - 8 and the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

¹⁰ These are the primary documents produced to direct U. S. foreign policy. Discussion of these objectives occurs in chapter four of the monograph.

¹¹ United States Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 2002, as amended August 2005).

by the Department of State, Department of Defense and the regional combatant commander to promote the achievement of strategic level foreign policy objectives.¹²

Operational level diplomacy refers to the bilateral activities of the United States government to influence the environment within an individual country. Guiding these efforts are the objectives and tasks established by the United States Ambassador to a particular country and the regional combatant commander to promote the achievement of theater strategic objectives.

Interagency coordination is the process of “coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.”¹³ This process is vital to the synchronization of diplomacy efforts between the regional combatant commander and the designated representatives of the Department of State.

Influence is the act or power of producing an effect without apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of command.¹⁴ A primary means of establishing influence is the conduct of diplomacy across the full spectrum of activities described above.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The driving concept behind this monograph is the thesis that military diplomacy, at the combatant command level, provides a theater strategic capability essential to the effective implementation of United States foreign policy. The monograph demonstrates that this capability arises from several organizational advantages. First, the authority vested in the combatant commander facilitates the development, resourcing and execution of military diplomacy

¹² Theater Strategic Guidance identified in the State Department’s *Strategic Plan*, Department of Defense’s *National Defense Strategy* and the regional combatant commander’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan.

¹³ United States Department of Defense. *Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 2002, as amended August 2005).

¹⁴ Webster’s Dictionary. *School and Office Dictionary, Second Edition* (New York: Random House, 2002), 275.

programs within a unified chain of command. Second, the combatant command contains a highly capable staff founded on historically proven structure and doctrine. This staff and the associated processes produce an ability to plan and organize that remains unmatched by departments within the executive branch of government. Third, an extensive network of personnel and organizations positioned to coordinate and liaise across multiple levels of authority facilitates the implementation of military diplomacy activities. Finally, an unmatched pool of resources, from which to execute military diplomacy, allows for great flexibility and responsiveness when adjusting to a complex environment. In addition, assessment of contemporary diplomatic efforts in the United States Pacific Command area of operations provides the foundation to identify the point(s) of friction within the current governmental structure. The intended end-state of the monograph is to elicit two primary responses from the reader. First, that the military does conduct diplomacy as part of its day-to day mission set. Second, that military diplomacy is an essential tool in facilitating the achievement of United States strategic foreign policy aims and theater strategic objectives.

CHAPTER TWO

MILITARY INFLUENCE: BEYOND THE VIOLENCE OF WARFARE

From the earliest days of history, many of the great minds of warfare addressed the need to understand the inevitable influence and involvement of military activities in affairs outside of war fighting. The linkage between military activities and those of diplomacy, economics, information, intelligence, and other elements of national power is not a newfound concept; rather it is a concept that dates back for centuries. From the earliest days of warfare, military theorists and practitioners, the likes of Sun Tzu, Frederick the Great, Carl von Clausewitz, and Alfred Thayer Mahan, recognized the interconnectedness of these elements and a need to coordinate and integrate them to achieve maximum effectiveness. These respected intellectuals establish the

foundation for understanding the role of the military beyond the limits of pure warfare.

Specifically, the linkage of the military with diplomacy comes in many variations, crossing a range of extremes in meaning, but never the less promotes the linkage. A common notion among these theorists and practitioners is the effectiveness of advancing foreign policy utilizing the military as a purveyor of diplomacy.

SUN TZU

The Chinese military theorist, Sun Tzu is perhaps the earliest advocate of the inextricable link between the military, diplomacy and other elements of national power. Dating from 500 B.C., Sun Tzu's work, *The Art of War*, discusses the interconnectedness of military action with not only diplomacy, but also with the aspects of economy and information. In the chapter, *Waging War*, Sun Tzu discusses this topic in his characteristically short prose. For example, Sun Tzu acknowledges the impact of warfare on the states economy, stating, "With the strength thus depleted and wealth consumed the households in the central plains will be utterly impoverished and seven-tenths of their wealth dissipated."¹⁵ Contextually framed in a discussion concerning the impact of protracted war, not only on the home state, but also on the enemy state, this quote demonstrates Sun Tzu's considerations beyond the purely military aspects of war. Sun Tzu's effort to portray the complexity of warfare and the interconnected nature of power lays the foundation for a military role beyond that of purveyor of violent warfare.

Sun Tzu indirectly discusses the role of both information and diplomacy in his writings on *Offensive Strategy*. "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."¹⁶ As becomes apparent in such quotes, Sun Tzu is acutely aware of the need to shape the environment to achieve a desired end-state. The skilled leader uses all means at his disposal to shape the environment, either to

¹⁵ Griffith, Samuel B. *Sun Tzu, The Art of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 74.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 79.

forego war altogether or to ensure victory if war becomes necessary. Influencing future outcomes by shaping the environment to ones advantage is the essence of military diplomacy.

FREDERICK AND CLAUSEWITZ

With progression through time came a progression in the theory and practice of coordinating the elements of national power. Two European icons of the 18th and 19th century military community, Frederick the Great and Carl von Clausewitz, advance the association of military and diplomatic activities as integrated tools in a nation's arsenal of power. Frederick the Great, not only practiced formal diplomacy as ruler of Prussia, but also wrote extensively about the importance of public and military diplomacy in *The Instruction of Frederick the Great for His Generals*. Carl von Clausewitz book, *On War*, is perhaps the most influential work on military theory to date, inextricably linking the tools of diplomacy and military action in the implementation of foreign policy. Frederick the Great and Carl von Clausewitz' writings leave little question that the military plays a vital role in the achievement of foreign policy objectives, a multifaceted role beyond that of pure warfare.

As King and Commander of Prussia and its forces, Frederick the Great not only wrote about military theory, but also practiced this theory. Based on this practice, Frederick wrote *The Instruction of Frederick the Great for His Generals* in 1747. In this instruction, Frederick stressed the need to understand the countries and locations in which his generals may potentially operate. Part of this understanding included traveling to these locations in times of peace. As stated by Frederick, the intent of such visits is to "...study the country where you are going to act....the places are visited, camps are chosen, roads are examined, the mayors of the villages, the butchers, and the farmers are talked to."¹⁷ Such visits not only provided an understanding of

¹⁷ Phillips, T.R. *Roots of Strategy: The 5 Greatest Military Classics of All Time*, ed. J.R. Phillips (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1985), 339.

potential adversaries, but also identified potential allies, potential assets and established vital, local relationships.

In addition to this aspect, the instruction addresses the need to create alliances with what is termed “neutral countries”. Frederick says, “In neutral countries it is necessary to make friends. If you can win over the whole country so much the better. At least form a body of your partisans!”¹⁸ Though Frederick does not specifically call these actions military diplomacy, he and his generals diplomatically negotiated with foreign entities in order to shape the regional environment. These activities allowed Frederick to improve both the strategic position of his state and the operational posture of his army; diplomatic activities conducted under the auspices of the Prussian military structure.

Frederick’s activities, as military commander, directly correlate to the activities of the contemporary combatant commander. Frederick makes every effort to shape his environment through the peacetime activities of military diplomacy, as defined in this monograph. Establishing formal alliances, professional relationships, and personal associations throughout the region, Frederick maximizes his potential influence through a variety of peacetime, diplomatic activities. Much as USPACOM facilitates the achievement of U.S. strategic aims in the Asia-Pacific, Frederick’s military diplomacy program facilitated the achievement of Prussian strategic aims.

Elaborating on the practices and writings of Frederick, Prussia’s next great military mind continued to expand on the complexity of military influence beyond the role of exporting violence. Relying on his vast experience and extensive educational training, Carl von Clausewitz authored perhaps the most influential military publication in the modern western world. *On War*, remains one of the most widely read publications in the military community, continuing to influence the activities of Western military forces to this day. In this work, Clausewitz firmly

¹⁸ Ibid., 356.

establishes the multi-faceted nature of the military as both a tool of warfare, as well as a tool of policy implementation. Clausewitz well known quote, “war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means” is indicative of this relationship and forms one of the pillars of his work.¹⁹

With the relationship of the military and policy in mind, Clausewitz identifies the need for the military leader to be a soldier-statesman.²⁰ In other words, the commander must understand the policy objectives of the nation-state, and apply the proper implement of power to achieve those objectives. A commander capable of combining the tools of warfare with those of diplomacy provides a formidable weapon in the drive for influence. As with his predecessor, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz forwards the argument that a great commander is one capable of achieving an end through many means of influence. Clausewitz argues that true military genius is marked by the ability to understand “exactly how much can be achieved with the means at his disposal”, while maintaining an awareness of the “entire political situation.”²¹

The concept of soldier-statesman, as forwarded by Clausewitz, closely parallels the requirements of the contemporary U.S. combatant commander. The expectations of these officers are to extrapolate strategic foreign policy guidance from a variety of documents and sources and translate that guidance into action. In other words, the statesman understands the desired strategic policy aims, develops programs and objectives to achieve those aims, while the organization operationalizes those objectives into viable action.

Expanding the context of this pillar, Clausewitz states, “No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors. . . . [Likewise,] if war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war . . . the only

¹⁹ Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War, Notes of 10 July 1827* ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p.69. Commander-in-Chief refers to the military commander rather than the President, as is the case in United States Government terminology.

²⁰ Ibid., 111.

²¹ Ibid., 112.

sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet.”²² Recommending that the commander-in-chief be a member of the cabinet, Clausewitz highlights the importance of fully synchronizing the multi-faceted capabilities of the military with the other tools of policy implementation. Incorporating the commander-in-chief as a member of the cabinet promotes the full vetting, coordination, and synchronization of government actions across the spectrum of power. Further clarifying his comments on war and policy, Clausewitz comments that, “... war springs from political purpose....Policy, then, will permeate all military operations and ... it will have continuous influence on them.”²³ It is self-evident that Clausewitz deems the integration of policy and military activities, through the lens of the soldier-statesman, as not only desirable, but as an absolute necessity.

Without directly addressing military diplomacy as defined in the monograph, Frederick the Great and Carl von Clausewitz both appear keenly aware of the potential effects of coordinating these activities. Frederick preaches the need to pursue, negotiate and maintain relationships to influence the environment in both times of war, as well as peace. It is this very concept that drives the actions described in the monograph introduction, and the purpose of examining the topic of military diplomacy. Clausewitz promotes the concept of the soldier-statesman as a necessity based on the inseparable nature of warfare and policy. This notion of soldier-statesman is the cornerstone of modern military diplomacy, a notion quite familiar and oft practiced by the regional combatant commanders of today.

²² Ibid., 608. In this context, Commander-in-Chief refers to the uniformed commander of military forces, not the presidential role of Commander-in-Chief as designated in the United States Constitution.

²³ Ibid., 645.

CAPTAIN ALFRED THAYER MAHAN

Applying the theoretical and practical perspectives of Frederick and Clausewitz to the sea, United States Naval Captain, Alfred Thayer Mahan developed the theory of “sea power”.²⁴ In the view of this author, Mahan forwards this theory as a means of achieving diplomatic, informational, military, and economic goals using maritime military diplomacy. Captain Mahan’s, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, is not just a historical study of maritime influences, but is also a theoretical model for the expansion of United States influence around the globe. Mahan’s book served as a warning to a nation he felt was neglecting this vital source of power. Using the historical genre, Mahan identifies deficiencies in United States naval and maritime policy at the closure of the 19th century, as well as the necessity of correcting these deficiencies. Mahan believed that for the United States to achieve greatness it must capitalize on the advantages gained by dominating the sea, both in peace and in war.²⁵

Underpinning Mahan’s theory are two principles: “1) command of the sea through naval superiority; and 2) that a combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets produces national wealth and greatness.”²⁶ The critical factor in attaining this dominance lies in a country’s prowess for commercial trade and shipping, the by-product of which form the building blocks of sea power. These include the development of a seafaring industrial base, a global network of trade and infrastructure, and a legitimate requirement to maintain a peacetime naval fleet capable of securing this commercial interest.²⁷

Establishing these assets overseas provides the nation with a large market for the trade of goods, establishes a precedence concerning the freedom of navigation on recognized trade routes,

²⁴ Paret, Peter. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 450.

²⁵ Ibid., 464.

²⁶ Ibid., 451.

²⁷ Mahan, Alfred. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783* (Dover: Dover Publications, 1987), passim. Paragraph paraphrases Mahan’s work to provide the reader the critical points of Mahan’s theory.

and provides safe harbors along these routes for the refuel and refit of merchant and naval shipping. This peacetime infrastructure is vital to the ability of a nation to project its naval power when transitioning to a war footing. Only through the establishment of a robust sea faring trade and industry can a nation ensure enduring sea power. Mahan proposed creating this paradigm on the back of a strong navy. This navy would establish favorable conditions for the United States economic, diplomatic, and military expansion by means of sheer presence, negotiations, and if required, force.²⁸

Captain Mahan used the historical backdrop of Europe to identify the preeminent role of maritime commerce, economic expansion, and naval diplomacy in the establishment of a dominant, enduring sea power. Mahan's dialogue on the need for sea power demonstrates the intricate connection of not only the diplomatic and military elements of national power, but also the economic element. Mahan's writings, credibility and personal relationships played a key role in shaping the actions taken by American leaders in the late 19th and 20th century. Figures such as President William McKinley and Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt relied heavily on Mahan's writings when contemplating the expansion of United States influence in the Asia-Pacific region.²⁹ This expansion leads to the acquisition or annexation of Guam, Hawaii, and the Philippines, as well as creating access to influential regional powers such as Japan. This foothold in the Pacific provided the United States the necessary influence to compete with European powers in the imperialist race for Asia.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

A study of the great minds of military theory and practice clearly reveals not only a capability by the military to operate beyond the realm of pure warfare, but also a need to aptly

²⁸ Ibid. Paragraph paraphrases Mahan work to provide the reader the critical points of Mahan's theory.

²⁹ LaFeber, Walter. *Mahan, Alfred Thayer*, The Companion to American History [Online Study Center] (Houghton Mifflin College Division, accessed 1 February 2006); available from http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/rcmh/html/rc_055600_mahanalfredt.htm, 2005.

apply these capabilities across the spectrum of national power. Sun Tzu builds the foundation by relating the unavoidable effects of the military on activities outside the framework of violent warfare. Frederick forwards the notion that military leaders must conduct diplomatically related activities in peacetime in order to fully understand and shape the environment prior to implementing any wartime action. Clausewitz takes the next evolutionary step by identifying the close relationship of policy and the power of the military. Based on this relationship, Clausewitz proposes the need for military leaders to be both soldier and statesman in order succeed fully. Finally, Alfred Thayer Mahan transforms these ideas into a theory of sea power predicated on the ability of the United States to achieve the full spectrum of foreign policy objectives using maritime military diplomacy.

CHAPTER THREE

A HISTORY OF U.S. MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN THE PACIFIC

THE EARLY DAYS

The works of Alfred Thayer Mahan provide an excellent transition to examine the historical use of military diplomacy, particularly in the Pacific theater. After years of influencing the development of the United States Navy via his association with former Secretary of the Navy and President, Theodore Roosevelt, Mahan's theory of naval expansion became reality. This reality began in earnest with the exploits of the "Great White Fleet", a fleet of battleships noted for their white painted hulls. On 16 December 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt reviewed the departure, from Hampton Roads, of sixteen battleships of the Atlantic Fleet.³⁰ This fleet of steam driven, steel-hulled battleships would circumnavigate the world as a demonstration of growing

³⁰ United States Department of the Navy. *The Cruise of the Great White Fleet* (Naval Historical Center, accessed October 2005); available from http://www.greatwhitefleet.info/Great_White_Fleet_Cruise.html.

United States power. For the next fourteen months and forty-three thousand miles, the men and machines of the Great White Fleet visited twenty countries, dramatically influencing the environment in their wake (Figure 1).³¹ Perhaps the most vital portion of this round the world trip was the cruise of the Asia-Pacific region. It was here that the United States felt most threatened by the colonialist expansion of the European powers, as well as the growing strength of Japan and its military forces.



Figure 1: Tour of the Great White Fleet, December 1907 to February 1909.

Of particular note is the visit of the Great White Fleet to Japan. It is here that Admiral Sperry's, the Fleet Commander, diplomatic skills would be most important, particularly when dealing with the vastly different culture of the Japanese government, military and society. With tensions rising between the United States and Japan over control of the southeast Asia, this port call held great significance for both parties involved.³² Prior to reaching Japan, the commander issued a directive allowing ashore "only first-class men, whose records showed no evidence of

³¹ Ibid.

³² Competition between the United States and Japan over potential colonial assets in the Pacific created tremendous friction, as these two emerging maritime powers moved to supplant the European powers in the Pacific.

previous indulgence in intoxicating liquor”.³³ Referring to the anticipated social events, Admiral Sperry informed his officers “the men will be made to understand that this, though an entertainment, is a matter of military duty”.³⁴ Such directives illustrate the importance and sensitivity of this particular visit.

Upon arrival, the Japanese met the United States fleet with great fanfare. As described by the Naval Historical Center, “When the US ships arrived, they were escorted into the bay by three Japanese destroyers, while on shore, school children sang ‘Hail Columbia’ and the ‘Star-Spangled Banner’. Japanese hospitality was indeed overflowing. All flag officers of the fleet were accommodated at the Emperor's Palace, while the ships' captains occupied suites at Tokyo's elegant Imperial Hotel.... For the entire week the fleet was in Japan, there was a constant round of celebrations, balls and parties. Adm. Togo of the Imperial Japanese Navy gave a garden party; Premier Katsura hosted a formal ball; and 50,000 Tokyo citizens honored the fleet with a torchlight parade.”³⁵

Amidst all of this grandeur and ceremony, Admiral Sperry and his men had infinite opportunities to, positively or negatively, influence Japanese attitudes, perceptions, and policy. Fortunately, these hand picked, well-disciplined officers, sailors, and marines perpetuated a positive image of the United States military and by association the same image of the government and the nation's citizenry. Seizing every opportunity on this historic cruise, Admiral Sperry engaged government officials, military leaders, and local citizens alike in order to set the conditions required to achieve U.S. foreign policy aims. Concerning Japan, “The fleet's visit had the desired result: it generated good will between both countries and eased tensions that might otherwise have led to open conflict. Much of the credit goes to Sperry, whose skill as a diplomat

³³ United States Department of the Navy. *The Cruise of the Great White Fleet* (Naval Historical Center, accessed October 2004); available from http://www.greatwhitefleet.info/Great_White_Fleet_Cruise.html. Accessed October 2005.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

and professionalism as an officer were crucial.”³⁶ As stated in President Theodore Roosevelt’s autobiography, “In my own judgment the most important service that I rendered to peace was the voyage of the battle fleet round the world.”³⁷

The combination of military discipline, cultural sensitivity, diplomatic prowess, and a demonstration of military might resulted in the building of relationships, access to infrastructure and economies, and generally improved the United States strategic position in the region. Admiral Sperry’s actions epitomized Clausewitz portrayal of the soldier-statesman. Effectively balancing military capabilities and diplomatic action, Admiral Sperry favorably shaped the Asia-Pacific environment to facilitate achievement of U.S. government policy. The cruise of the “Great White Fleet” bore the seeds of modern military diplomacy.

WORLD WAR II- THE PINNACLE OF MILITARY DIPLOMACY

As with many aspects of United States history, one could argue that achievement of the pinnacle in military diplomacy occurred during and immediately following World War II. In defeating the Axis powers and subsequently rebuilding these powers, the United States government demonstrated an exceptionally high degree of interagency coordination and integration. Both in the European theater and the Pacific theater, military leaders largely directed the efforts of the United States and Allied governments. In Europe, Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower often played the vital diplomatic role of arbitrator amongst the varying positions of Allied military and political leaders. The Army’s official centennial biography addresses this, stating, “But Eisenhower was more than just the coalition's chief soldier. He was also a statesman involved as deeply in arranging the political and diplomatic aspects of the alliance as the military. In the politico-military realm, he encountered the sorts of

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Roosevelt, Theodore. *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography*. (New York: MacMillan, 1913).

contentious international issues that could divide even friends and learned to mediate the conflicting demands of men and nations.”³⁸

In Japan, General Douglas MacArthur likewise directed the actions of the Allied powers in wartime and then directed post-war activities during the ensuing occupation. It is the occupation, rebuilding, and transformation of Japan that provides the greatest example of effectively integrating diplomatic, as well as information and economic activities within the military structure. General MacArthur, appointed proconsul of Japan, established a highly capable, fully integrated command structure referred to as the General Headquarters/Supreme Commander Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP). Under MacArthur’s command, the GHQ/SCAP contained the typical military G-staff members, as well as special staff sections. The special staff sections included a diplomatic section, public information section, industrial and economic section, and numerous other civil related coordinating and implementing sections (Figure 2).³⁹ These sections played a critical role in coordinating GHQ/SCAP efforts that crossed departmental line of authority within the executive branch of government.⁴⁰ This arrangement left little doubt as to the chain of command regarding all actions pertaining to the occupation, reconstruction and transformation of Japan, governmentally, socially, economically, and militarily.

In his proconsul role, General MacArthur regularly tapped into the executive branch departments of the United States government, attaining the necessary support required to achieve established objectives. MacArthur and his staff coordinated issues and concerns relating to policy, jurisdiction, and reporting authority to ensure all agencies involved clearly understood their role and responsibilities within the GHQ/SCAP chain of command. Though not without friction, these other government agencies understood the necessity of working through such a

³⁸ U.S. Army Center for Military History. *Dwight David Eisenhower: The Centennial*, Center for Military History Publication 71-40. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1990), 10.

³⁹ General Headquarters/Supreme Commander Allied Powers Organization Chart.

⁴⁰ Executive Branch Organizational Chart provided in Appendix 1.

structure to support established policy objectives directed and implemented by General Douglas MacArthur and his headquarters.




Figure 2: General Headquarters/Supreme Commander Allied Powers Organization Chart.

Historical records provide insight to the level of cooperation that General MacArthur received in bringing to bare the elements of national power.⁴¹ Of particular note is the relationship between the War Department and the Department of State, more specifically, the GHQ/SCAP and the Department of State Policy Planning Staff. George F. Kennan, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, authored much of the guidance provided for the post-war occupation of Japan. Mr. Kennan demonstrated a keen awareness that the War Department, not the Department of State, possessed the capabilities and resources required to coordinate, direct and implement the actions necessary to achieve United States policy. Therefore, Mr. Kennan and his

⁴¹ Kennan, George F. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Volume VI, (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 25 March 1948), 691-719. Includes Memoranda of Conversations with General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

planning staff established a broad policy framework which General MacArthur and his staff operationalized by developing the actionable details required for execution.

In addition to developing policy, the State Department worked diligently to maintain the effectiveness of the evolving relationship between GHQ/SCAP and Department of State. As circumstances in Japan changed, the State Department adjusted the degree and means of commitment provided in support of the stability and reconstruction efforts. For example, Mr. Kennan issued a policy recommendation in March 1948 stating, “As soon as this is practically feasible, and desirable, the Department of State should send to Tokyo a permanent Political Representative, with the rank of Ambassador. The functions of this official would be to advise the Commander-in-Chief on political matters ⁴²....He would not, at least in the initial period, deal officially with the Japanese Government, although there would be no restrictions on his informal contact with Japanese government officials.”⁴³ Understanding the maturation of the process and the sensitivity of the situation, Mr. Kennan envisions the mechanism for eventual transition to a traditional, civil government establishment. Assigning an Ambassador in this fashion allows for the forming of vital diplomatic relationships without undercutting the authority of General MacArthur and his staff. Achievement of such actions required extensive communication between Mr. Kennan’s staff and General MacArthur’s staff.

With this relationship in mind, Mr. Kennan worked closely with General MacArthur and his special staff, ensuring that GHQ/SCAP attained the necessary support from all government agencies with an interest in Japan. Mr. Kennan clearly reinforces this position in policy statement twenty-eight, stating, “White House authority should be, if necessary, invoked to see that the cooperation of all agencies and departments of the Government is enlisted in the implementation

⁴² Commander-in-Chief refers to General MacArthur as Commander, Supreme Command Allied Powers rather than the contemporary identification of the President of the United States.

⁴³ Kennan, George F. *Policy Planning Staff/28: Recommendations With Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan*. (Washington D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 25 March 1948).

of these recommendations.”⁴⁴ The recommendations to which George Kennan is referring are strategic policy recommendations that address the full spectrum of issues associated with nation building; recommendations operationalized by General MacArthur and his headquarters.

The long-term success achieved in Japan is directly attributable to the close working relationship between these elements of the War Department and Department of State. Three key factors played a vital role in this process. First, all actions taken across the spectrum of power were properly vetted within a unified command structure prior to implementation. Second, the GHQ staff and the policy planning staff worked effectively through a process of communication and coordination, eliminating ambiguity between the policy writing and implementation. Finally, the close, personal working relationship of General MacArthur and George Kennan provided a means of resolving issues of contention in a constructive manner rather than a manner disruptive to the process on the ground.

Often referred to as the “Greatest Generation”, the World War II generation unquestionably achieved many of this country’s greatest accomplishments.⁴⁵ One such accomplishment certainly lies in the post-war reconstruction efforts in Japan. Accomplishment of such feats could only occur with the tremendous cooperation and absolute commitment of the American people and the whole of the government that represents them. The Department of State and the War Department demonstrated this cooperation and commitment in Japan, purposefully integrating the capabilities of each agency in order to reach identified national policy objectives.

This post World War II model provides an excellent framework from which to assess the structure, integration, and coordination of contemporary military diplomacy efforts in relation to the Department of State. Comparing the historical and contemporary staff organizations,

⁴⁴ Kennan, George F. *Policy Planning Staff/28: Recommendations With Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan*. (Washington D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 25 March 1948).

⁴⁵ Brokaw, Tom. *The Greatest Generation*. (New York: Random House, 1998). Phrase coined by Tom Brokaw in his work to chronicle the story of the World War II American soldier.

mechanisms of interagency coordination, and the commander's role in military diplomacy efforts establishes a measure of relevance for contemporary military diplomacy programs.

KOREA: THE TRUMAN-MACARTHUR INCIDENT

One of the greatest hindrances to the achievement of this goal is a continuing debate over the proper civil-military relationship within the government. The achievements of General MacArthur, as proconsul to Japan, provide an extreme example of the military's potential outside of the traditional role of war fighting. Many critics believe that using the military in such a manner poses a significant threat to the proper civil-military relationship. This relationship, as noted by Samuel Huntington as "objective civilian control", argues that military involvement in policy decisions must be strictly limited.⁴⁶ Huntington forwards the theory that the establishment of policy is purely a function of civilian leadership, and if requiring force, the execution of that policy strictly by military leaders.⁴⁷ Ironically, it is the actions of General MacArthur, during the Korean War, that provide critics with a vivid example of what can happen when delegation of responsibility results in perceived abdication of authority by overambitious military leaders.

In 1951, the United States witnessed perhaps the greatest challenge of the 20th century to the constitutionally established civil-military relationship. The challenge focused on "the right of a President to demand compliance to his policies as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces."⁴⁸ By virtue of this position and the positions of Chief Executive and Chief Diplomat, the President exercises the authority to establish foreign policy, direct the implementation of that policy, and demand the military comply with that policy. The genesis of this controversy stems from the opposition and in some instances, complete disregard by General Douglas MacArthur of presidential directives and stated national policy objectives concerning the Korean War.

⁴⁶ Huntington, Samuel. *The Soldier and the State* (New York: Random House, 1958), 80.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 189.

⁴⁸ Miller, Julie. *Truman or MacArthur: Who's In Command?* (United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1992), 3.

The situation finds the United States balancing the demands of the Cold War and the potential for global conflict. In response to this situation, President Harry S. Truman adopted a policy of limited war in response to the growing communist threat presented by the Soviet Union and China. In conjunction with this containment strategy, Truman established limited policy objectives for the Korean War in order to prevent provocation of a general war with the Soviet Union and China. These objectives included “military operations either to force the North Koreans behind the 38th parallel or to destroy their forces”, with the caveat that MacArthur would halt ground operations if the Soviet Union or China entered the war.⁴⁹

Opposing Truman’s policy objectives was the highly popular World War II general and Far East Commander, General Douglas MacArthur. Staunchly opposed to the concept of limited warfare, General MacArthur frequently conducted operations deemed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President, as exceeding directed national policy.⁵⁰ Despite numerous edicts, rebukes, and, confrontations in response to these actions, MacArthur stepped up his campaign against President Truman’s policy. This campaign not only flouted national policy, but also attempted to sway this policy by actively engaging the media and members of congress in forwarding his desire for “complete victory” in resolving the Korean conflict.⁵¹ This continued subversion of the President, his constitutional powers, and national policy directly challenged the foundation of civil-military relationship in this country.

On 11 April 1951, Truman took action to reaffirm the preeminence of civil authority over the military. With the full support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Truman relieved General MacArthur of his command and ordered his return to the United States.⁵² In the ensuing press release, President Truman stated that “Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a

⁴⁹ Herspring, Dale. *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 76.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 78.

⁵¹ Ibid., 77.

⁵² United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Pentagon Statement on the Relief of Gen. MacArthur*. (Washington D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, April 1951).

vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling.”⁵³

Though Truman effectively ended the challenge to his authority when he relieved General MacArthur, the debate concerning proper civil-military relations continues to this day. Theorists and practitioners alike continue to struggle over the proper balance of authority concerning the integration of military activities in determining the path of foreign policy. This debate dramatically influenced the legislation undertaken over the next several decades to formalize the successful, wartime national security apparatus, while maintaining proper civil authority over a powerful military establishment.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The historical vignettes of this chapter establish a foundation of U.S. military diplomacy at three levels. First, the cruise of the Great White Fleet illustrates the earliest examples of United States efforts to expand its regional and global influence utilizing military diplomacy. Through the diplomatic prowess of Admiral Sperry and other naval leaders, the conditions were set for the global expansion of the United States as a burgeoning world power. Second, General MacArthur and the GHQ/SCAP exemplify the potential of an empowered military commander to implement foreign policy through means of military diplomacy. The implementation of U.S. foreign policy under the guidance of a military leader provides an excellent model from which to compare the contemporary activities of the USPACOM combatant command. Finally, the Truman-MacArthur incident illuminates the potential for friction when the military oversteps the acceptable bounds of influence in the realm of foreign policy implementation. General

⁵³ Statement by President Harry S. Truman. *Statement by President Truman Relieving Gen. MacArthur of His Military Duties* (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, April 1951).

MacArthur's insubordinate actions in Korea undermined the very cooperation with the President and the executive branch that had proven so effective following World War II. All of these historical vignettes influenced the legislation, structure, and authority related to the national security apparatus for decades to come.

CHAPTER FOUR

LEGISLATING SUCCESS: FROM PROCONSUL TO COMBATANT COMMANDER

The height of military diplomacy and interagency cooperation achieved during and immediately following World War II proved a catalyst for transforming the national security structure. Such transformation ignited a political, legislative struggle, which continues even today, over the proper balance of power within the nation's defense structure. This struggle began with the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA '47) and continued in earnest through the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nichols Act). These two acts and several intermediary legislative amendments illustrate the long, difficult process required to implement a compromised version of the World War II defense structure and associated processes. The purpose of this chapter is to define those elements of legislation that created the contemporary combatant command and instilled the requisite powers necessary to implement military diplomacy programs at the theater strategic level.

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

Intent on streamlining the security apparatus of this country by mirroring the successful institutions and processes adopted during World War II, NSA '47 and the pursuant amendments established many of the government agencies and functions familiar to Americans today (Figure

3).⁵⁴ Implementing lessons learned from World War II, this hallmark act established a bureaucracy conceived to improve the government's ability to coordinate issues of national security. Entities such as the National Security Council and the Department of Defense evolved from government efforts to maintain and improve upon the achievements of wartime and post-war ad hoc structures. Emerging from this act are the basic structures under which the national security apparatus and the military operate today.

LEGISLATION	PROVISIONS
1947 National Security Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Designated Secretary of National Defense to exercise general authority, direction, and control • Created the National Military Establishment • Established U.S. Air Force • Established CIA and NSC • Established JCS as permanent agency • JCS became principal military advisers to President and Secretary of Defense • Established a legal basis for unified and specified commands
1948 Key West Agreement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confirmed JCS members' function as executive agents for unified commands • Service roles defined
1949 Amendment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military department heads lost cabinet rank and were removed from NSC • Renamed NME the Department of Defense • Created office of Chairman

Figure 3: Summation of the National Security Act of 1947 and Pertinent Amendments.

⁵⁴ National Defense University. *JFSC Pub 1, Joint Staff Officers Guide* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000).

In addition to creating the National Security Council, NSA '47 also directed a major reorganization of the existing military structure. Focused on streamlining the defense establishment, the stated goal was to achieve “unified direction under civilian control ...provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration...and provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces.”⁵⁵ The act targeted the traditional organization of the War Department and the Navy Department to rid these institutions of perceived duplications and inefficiencies, as well as reassert civilian authority over the military. This included merging the War and Navy Departments to create a single chain of command under a National Military Establishment, later renamed the Department of Defense.⁵⁶ This action effectively removed uniformed military representation from cabinet level positions within the government, replacing it with a single civilian Secretary of Defense.

Subordinate to the Department of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the newly created Air Force maintained separate departments headed by a civilian secretary and a military service chief. In addition to service specific responsibilities, the military chiefs fulfilled a second role as the now formalized Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this role, the service chiefs were responsible for coordinating inter-service activities, as well as advising the Secretary of Defense and the President on matters of defense. Though the Army and Navy Departments lost much of the operational control of forces, they retained executive and administrative control of these forces in accordance with Title X, United States Code and through empowerment as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵⁷ Despite the reduction of direct military power following the war, formalization of this dual role allowed the military department chiefs to maintain tremendous influence within the government.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Amendment of the term *National Military Establishment* to *Department of Defense* occurred in 1949.

⁵⁷ Title X, U.S. Code directs the requirements for training, equipping, and maintaining military forces.

Finally and perhaps most importantly to the future of military diplomacy, NSA '47 established the requirement for “unified and specified” combatant commands, the precursor to the modern day regional and functional combatant commanders.⁵⁸ Based on the effectiveness of the unified wartime commands, these combatant commands were designed to overcome service rivalries and biases in order to maximize joint capabilities. Intended to provide unified direction of combatant forces, the unified commands were not initially empowered to achieve this purpose. Much of the necessary power remained with the service chiefs, who exercised executive agent authority over the unified commander’s subordinate forces.⁵⁹ The service departments maintained influence over the unified commands, both operationally and administratively, utilizing the dual authorities as service Chiefs of Staff and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The necessary empowerment of unified and specified combatant commanders would take decades to achieve.

The aforementioned changes mirror many of the successful, ad hoc processes and organizations necessitated by war. Despite the commonalities retained from this successful structure, implementing these changes proved to be problematic at best. Struggles over the traditional division of power between the executive and legislative branches, civil and military agencies, and within the military establishment itself greatly hindered the full implementation and achievement of the goals set forth in the NSA '47. Though dramatically improving the United States ability to conduct defense related activities, the NSA '47 fell far short of creating the fully integrated structure envisioned.

⁵⁸ Unified Command is defined as a military command which has broad, continuing missions under a single commander and which is composed of forces from two or more military departments. Specified Command is defined as a military command which has broad, continuing missions and which is normally composed of forces from one military department.

⁵⁹ Authorized Executive Agent status IAW the 1948 Key West Agreement and the 1953 Amendment.

DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACTS OF 1958 AND 1986

For the next several decades, senior civilian and defense leaders struggled to overcome the pitfalls of NSA '47 and re-establish the preeminence of the military as a viable means of executing foreign policy across the breadth of national power. Correcting the many shortcomings of the NSA '47 required numerous amendments to the original act, two significant legislative actions, and a process of refinement and implementation that continues to this very day.⁶⁰ Of primary note in this process are the Defense Reorganization Acts of 1958 and 1986. These two pieces of legislation profoundly altered the power paradigm within the Department of Defense and the national security apparatus. This paradigm shift maximized the power of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and most importantly the Combatant Commanders, while reducing the power of the individual military departments and the Chiefs of Staff (Figure 4).⁶¹

Suffering from a continued lack of power, the inability of combatant commander to overcome the influence and authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained a significant issue. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 partially resolved this issue by removing the executive agent authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their military departments. This effectively removed the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the operational chain of command, relegating this body strictly to an advisory role as joint staff members and force providers, as military department chiefs. This gradual transfer of power and authority to the combatant commander continued over the course of the next two decades.

⁶⁰ Significant amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 occurred in 1948, 1949, 1952, 1953, 1958, 1978 and 1986.

⁶¹ National Defense University. *Joint Staff Officers Guide JFSC Pub 1* (Washington D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 2000).

LEGISLATION	PROVISIONS
<i>1958 Defense Reorganization Act</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gave Chairman a vote • Removed military department as executive agent <p>Joint Staff has no executive authority, but assists the Secretary of Defense in exercising direction over unified commands</p>
<i>1986 Defense Reorganization Act</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Designated Chairman principal military adviser • Transferred duties of corporate JCS to Chairman • Created position of Vice Chairman <p>Specified chain of command to run from President to Secretary of Defense to unified and specified combatant commanders</p>

Figure 4: Summation of the 1958 and 1986 Defense Reorganization Acts.

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 furthered the actions of the 1958 Act, cementing the combatant commands as the preeminent element within the uniformed services. Better known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, this legislation set the conditions required to re-establish the military as an effective tool in the implementation and execution of foreign policy, both militarily and diplomatically.⁶²

The Goldwater-Nichols Act thoroughly resolves the issue of executive authority by declaring, “The Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands. The ‘chain of command’ runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”⁶³ With direct

⁶² Named for Senators Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols who cosponsored the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

⁶³ United States Congressional Legislation. *The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*. (Washington D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, October 1986).

accountability to the President and the Secretary of Defense established, combatant commanders also received the commensurate authorities necessary to accomplish the broad role they play in national security.⁶⁴

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 proved to be a critical step in the re-emergence of the military community as viable capability in the realm of peacetime foreign policy. The empowerment of the unified commander, as originally intended, set the conditions required for contemporary combatant commanders to fulfill a role similar to that of the post-World War II military proconsul. With a clear chain of command, tremendous professional and personal stature, and control of immense resources and capabilities, the contemporary combatant commanders influence, support, and in some cases directly participate in the full spectrum of foreign policy activities. The Goldwater-Nichols Act represents nearly four decades of continuous debate, struggle and reorganization, culminating in a modern day security apparatus centered on a unified combatant command structure. It is this structure and its enormous capability that have drawn many Presidents to rely on the military to implement foreign policy under the auspices of military diplomacy.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The nature of the total war fought in World War II dramatically empowered the leadership of the United States military. The massive build up of forces, the staggering resources commanded by the military, and the expert and reverent power wielded by the military's senior leadership placed this institution in a position of tremendous influence. As the war progressed, civilian departments became ever more irrelevant as the executive branch bypassed traditionally recognized agencies. Following the war, civilian government agencies began to resume a more

⁶⁴ Ibid. Combatant Command includes the authority to direct subordinate commands in all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics; prescribe the chain of command; organize the command and the forces within the command; employ forces as necessary to accomplish the missions assigned; assign command functions to subordinates; coordinate and approve administrative support.

traditional role, reasserting their pre-war dominance in the areas of economics, information and diplomacy.

The struggle to regain some normality and balance in the civil-military relationship created a dichotomy of objectives for the government. One objective was the formalization of the ad hoc processes and organizations that achieved many of this country's greatest accomplishments. The second objective was the rebalancing the civil-military relationship over a highly influential and empowered military. This dichotomy resulted in decades of cautionary legislation, power struggles, and inefficiencies that have inhibited the creation of integrated processes and organizations to maximize the nation's potential power. Not until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, did the government organize and empower a military establishment that approaches the capability of the World War II era unified commands.

Modern day combatant commands, such as the United States Pacific Command, are the 21st century recreation of General MacArthur's GHQ/SCAP of World War II. This incarnate organization balances the demands of democratic society for civilian oversight, with the autonomy to implement military diplomacy programs aimed at achieving the foreign policy goals established by this country's leaders. Currying tremendous international influence, controlling enormous resources, and capable of quickly executing a wide variety of missions, the combatant command provides an invaluable means of exporting United States foreign policy, through the use of force in times war and through the use of military diplomacy in times of peace.

CHAPTER FIVE

STRATEGIC FOREIGN POLICY: SHAPING MILITARY DIPLOMACY

Despite the tremendous influence and power wielded by today's combatant commanders, these individuals do not create regional foreign policy goals and implement military diplomacy programs to achieve those goals without significant guidance from the nation's civil authorities.

The combatant commander receives foreign policy guidance and direction through both, the executive and legislative branches of government.⁶⁵ At times, the guidance and direction is contradicting in nature due to the differing agendas driving the executive and legislative branch. The often-diverging agendas create friction points, frequently left for resolution at the theater strategic level.

For example, USPACOM must carefully design engagement programs dealing with the country of Indonesia. Caution must be taken in order to satisfy the executive branch need to engage this pivotal Muslim country without violating the legislative prohibitions on training and funding established in the Leahy Amendment.⁶⁶ The executive branch of government desires to engage Indonesia as a potential partner in the war on terror, as well as assisting the country's fledgling institutions of democracy. In contrast, the legislative branch restricts funds, training, and engagement activities targeted for Indonesia due to the poor human rights record of the Indonesian security forces.

The combatant commander often rectifies these conflicting goals, by finding means of limited engagement that achieve the intent of both branches of government. One such means is through the conduct of CARAT or Cooperative Afloat Readiness and Training, which provides a platform to carry out humanitarian type activities from offshore.⁶⁷ Closely coordinated with Congress, Department of State, and Department of Defense, these naval exercises maintain a

⁶⁵ The executive branch develops and directs foreign policy through a series of strategy documents discussed in the context of this chapter. The legislative branch shapes foreign policy through congressional legislation that prohibits, promotes, restricts and directs specific activities related to foreign policy programs.

⁶⁶ The Leahy Amendment, as applied to the 2001 Defense Appropriations Act, states "none of the funds made available by this act may be used to support any training program involving a unit of the security forces of a foreign country if... a member of such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken."

⁶⁷ The CARAT program with Indonesia focuses on medical, dental, and civic engineering projects at local communities, as well as improving U.S. and Indonesian interoperability in case of future natural disasters. United States Navy. *Cooperation Readiness Afloat Training* [journal on-line] available from <http://www.clwp.navy.mil/carat/indnesia>; accessed 5 February 2006.

modicum of engagement, while upholding the legal requirements established in the Leahy Amendment.⁶⁸

Though acknowledging the significant role of the legislative branch, for the purpose of brevity, the remainder of the chapter focuses on the interactions within the executive branch of government. Foreign policy development and coordination within the executive branch bears most significance to the topic of military diplomacy. The process of developing and coordinating, across executive branch departments, the diplomatic efforts of the United States begins at the strategic level. It is imperative this process capitalizes upon the capabilities of each of the departments within the executive branch of government to maximize the efforts in the pursuit of strategic level foreign policy.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

The capstone document that drives the development and coordination process is the National Security Strategy (NSS), published by the President. Considering this fact, one must ask, does the *NSS* provide sufficient guidance to ensure a coordinated diplomatic effort? If not, where does the interagency coordination occur to synchronize departmental efforts toward a common goal? What are the responsibilities of the executive departments of government regarding the NSS? This section addresses these questions and assesses the current efforts to correct shortcomings in this process.

Publication of the *National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS)* initiates the formal process of establishing the goals and direction of U.S. foreign policy. This document guides the development of strategic policy and activities required to achieve the country's desired goals. Goals identified by President Bush as, "political and economic freedom, peaceful relations

⁶⁸ USPACOM liaises with Congress through two primary means: 1) Testimony of the Combatant Commander and 2) congressional communications facilitated by USPACOM Special Staff for Legislative Affairs.

with other states, and respect for human dignity” aimed at making “the world not just safer, but better”.⁶⁹ The President identifies a series of activities, across the spectrum of national power, required to achieve these goals. These activities include:

- champion aspirations for human dignity,
- strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends,
- work with others to defuse regional conflicts,
- prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction,
- ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade,
- expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy,
- develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power,
- transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century and,
- engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.⁷⁰

The goals and activities identified in the *NSS* provide the departments within the executive branch a baseline from which to develop institutional guidance for subordinate organizations. By law, each of the subordinate departments of government must develop a strategic plan, within the established authorities of the department, to implement the guidance provided in the *NSS*.⁷¹ This guidance includes the requisite strategy documents published to direct the diplomatic and military activities of the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

⁶⁹ President George W. Bush. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, March 2006).

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Published in accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.

SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2004-2009

As the lead agency for implementing diplomacy and foreign policy, the Department of State publishes a strategy document to guide these efforts. As stated in the *Security, Democracy, Prosperity; Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2004-2009*, “The strategic plan supports the policy positions set forth by President Bush in the *National Security Strategy* and presents how the Department of State and USAID will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance.”⁷² The State Department strategy identifies strategic foreign policy objectives, as well as provides implementation guidance to the internal agencies and embassies tasked to achieve these objectives. The current State Department objectives are:

- achieve peace and security,
- advance sustainable development and global interests,
- promote international understanding, and
- strengthen diplomatic and program capabilities.

These strategic objectives are notable in that they require significant cooperation by various outside agencies, to include the Regional Combatant Commands, in order to achieve fully. Acknowledging this fact, this strategy identifies “key U.S. Government partners...that could affect achievement of these goals.”⁷³ Though identifying these “cross cutting” concerns, the State Department plan fails to establish a means to conduct the necessary strategic level interagency coordination to ensure goal accomplishment.⁷⁴

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Department of Defense also publishes a strategy document directing global military efforts in support of national security. Based firmly on the guidance in the President’s *NSS*, the

⁷² United States Department of State. *Security, Democracy, Prosperity; Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2004-2009* (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, August 2003).

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (NDS) communicates a broad, strategic plan intended to “create conditions conducive to respect for the sovereignty of nations and secure international order favorable to freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity.”⁷⁵ The *NDS* frames the current security environment, outlines strategic objectives, provides implementation guidance, and identifies desired capabilities and attributes required to meet changing global demands.⁷⁶ The objectives identified in the *NDS* provide the general framework from which theater strategic activities are developed. Those objectives are to:

- secure the United States from direct attack,
- secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action,
- strengthen alliances and partnerships, and
- establish favorable security conditions.⁷⁷

Falling within the Department of Defense chain of command, the combatant commander relies heavily on the *NDS* to provide militarily relevant foreign policy guidance in order to shape the activities within his designated region of responsibility.

The three formal strategies described above contribute heavily to the regional combatant commander’s source of formal material considered in the formulation of military diplomacy programs. This stated, what the departmental level strategies do not do is horizontally nest their documents to ensure an integrated, synchronized effort incorporating all of the tools associated with national power. Developed in a stovepipe system of planning, the State Department’s *Strategic Plan* and the Defense Department’s *NDS* do not facilitate the integration of capabilities at the strategic level.

Conceptually, the mechanism responsible for nesting strategic level policy and activities, across departments, falls under the purview of the National Security Council (NSC). As

⁷⁵ United States Department of Defense. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, March 2005).

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

originally intended in *NSA '47*, the “function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the ‘integration’ of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”⁷⁸

Realistically, the National Security Council rarely performs this function, continually evolving in viability, function, organization, and effectiveness.

Often acting as the Presidents personal initiatives group, the NSC rarely performs the planning and coordination required to ensure the integrated application of national power. The evolution of this group from the original concept is quite apparent in the current administrations statement of purpose. The official White House web page states, “The National Security Council is the President's principal forum for ‘considering’ national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials.”⁷⁹ Shifting this body away from the original function of integration to a body primarily retained for consultation results in a vacuum of responsibility for the integration and implementation of strategic level diplomacy efforts in support of stated foreign policy goals.

Without a viable mechanism of integration, the Department of State and Department of Defense fail to produce a single, fully integrated document that establishes a clear chain of authority and agency responsibilities for the conduct of activities requiring interagency cooperation in support of the *NSS*. Rather, the individual departments produce distinct strategies that tacitly acknowledge a need for interagency support, but take no action to develop this support. For instance, the Department of State identifies “cross cutting” activities which may be effected by “key U.S. Government partners.”⁸⁰ The Department of Defense states that the intent

⁷⁸ United States Congressional Legislation. *National Security Act of 1947. Section 2, Declaration of Policy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, July 1947).

⁷⁹ United States Government. *National Security Council* (Official White House website, accessed January 2005); available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc>.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

of the NDS is to provide, “a broad strategic context for employing military capabilities in concert with other elements of national power.”⁸¹ Despite these tacit acknowledgements, little to no formal coordination occurs at the strategic level to ensure unity of effort in the diplomatic arena. In reality, strategic level coordination remains a complex, illusive, primarily ad hoc process, highly dependent on individual personalities (See Figure 5).⁸²




Figure 5: National Defense University Depiction of Strategic Level Interagency Process

Considering these institutional failures, what steps are underway to correct this shortcoming at the strategic level? The National Defense University studied this very problem and recommended several actions to improve interagency/interdepartmental cooperation. These recommendations call for legislation to mandate interagency coordination, development of a National Interagency Coordination Group, and building more robust engagement capabilities

⁸¹ United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow*. (Washington D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 2004).

⁸² Ibid.

within the civilian departments to facilitate interagency planning and coordination.⁸³

Implementation of these recommendations continues to labor through the government bureaucracy with little real movement toward resolving this issue.

In addition to formal documentation, combatant commanders and their staffs must be adept at capturing and interpreting foreign policy decisions relayed outside of the formal channels. Foreign policy considerations surface across all of the various forms of media. The President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense participate in news conferences, provide press releases, and post information to official websites on a daily basis. This form of information dissemination serves as a means of providing frequent, accessible feedback to a bureaucratic system that otherwise prohibits such timely communications.

One such instance occurred during a recent Presidential trip to India. On March 2, 2006, President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh released a joint statement outlining the future of the strategic partnership between the United States and India. This outline included guidance for economic prosperity and trade, energy security, innovation and the knowledge economy, global safety and security, and deepening democracy and meeting international challenges.⁸⁴ Such statements often convey a strategic assessment of current foreign policy, as well as suggest necessary adjustments to account for the changing global, regional or local environment. Each of the sections within the joint U.S.-India statement directly or indirectly influences the establishment of military diplomacy programs developed to achieve this strategic level guidance. It is the combatant commander's and his staff's responsibility to account for strategic policy adjustments within the military diplomacy programs carried out in the theater strategic environment.

⁸³ National Defense University. *Strategic Level Interagency Process: A Work in Progress* (National Defense University, accessed 6 February 2006); available from http://www.ndu.edu/itea/storage/543/Interagency_Process_Short.ppt.

⁸⁴ Statement by President George Bush. *United States and India Joint Statement* (White House webpage, March 2006); available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/2006/03/20060302-05.html>.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

What is the relevance of examining sources of foreign policy guidance? First, it identifies and defines three, key documents that shape the military diplomacy programs at the combatant command level. Second, it identifies a shortcoming concerning the horizontal integration of strategy across the executive branch departments. Third, it highlights the continual need of combatant commanders and their staffs to assess the implementation of military diplomacy programs against the ever-changing foreign policy environment.

The process of strategic foreign policy development is a complicated, illusive one that lacks comprehensive integration and formalization. Though nested within the framework provided by the *NSS*, the horizontal nesting of objectives and activities between the executive branch departments continues to suffer from a lack of procedural structure and oversight. Correcting the deficiencies of the interagency coordination process requires a long term commitment to implement the legislation, organizations, and cultural transformation recommended in studies such as that conducted by the National Defense University. In the interim, much of the responsibility for de-confliction, integration, and coordination of U.S. foreign policy efforts occur at the theater strategic level, facilitated by a highly capable combatant command structure.

CHAPTER SIX

CONTEMPORARY MILITARY DIPLOMACY: UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

In the contemporary operating environment, the regional combatant commander not only interprets strategic foreign policy but also operationalizes that policy within the domain of his command. Understanding the role of the contemporary combatant commander, one quickly understands the enormous power and capability this individual wields in implementing national

policy. Not only can the combatant commander influence policy through traditional applications of military force as directed by the President, but he can also influence policy through the conduct of military diplomacy. In many ways, the contemporary combatant commander and his organization perform a similar role to that performed by General MacArthur and the GHQ/SCAP during the occupation and reconstruction of Japan. Both organizations utilized military resources and capabilities to achieve diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives in support of strategic foreign policy aims.

To understand the similarity of these roles, this chapter outlines the interactions of the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and its commander at the strategic, theater strategic and operational levels. First, examining the process of coordination undertaken by USPACOM demonstrates the efforts of the military to maintain a working relationship with the Department of State, at all levels. Performing this coordination is a fully integrated system of staff functions and organizations tailored to mitigate potential friction caused by programs that cross one or more lines of authority. Second, outlining the executive level diplomacy performed by USPACOM illustrates the comparable level of empowerment achieved by the modern day combatant commander. The high-level diplomacy efforts of the contemporary combatant commander correlate to the integral role played by General MacArthur in achieving U.S. policy aims in the Asia-Pacific. Finally, the chapter explores the implementation of foreign policy through actionable programs at the theater strategic and operational levels. As did GHQ/SCAP programs, USPACOM military diplomacy programs capitalize on the extensive resources and capabilities available to the combatant command through the unified command structure. The purpose of the chapter is to establish that the military clearly conducts theater strategic diplomatic activities essential to the achievement of foreign policy aims. Additionally, the chapter demonstrates that USPACOM, much as General MacArthur and GHQ/SCAP did, develops, coordinates and implements these diplomatic activities through processes, organizations and resources designed for this very purpose.

MITIGATING THE TURF WAR: MULTI-TIERED COORDINATION

USAPCOM military diplomacy programs, by their very nature, infringe on the Department of States authorities in the realm of foreign policy and diplomacy. Implementing military diplomacy programs that cross the authoritative lines of the Department of State, the combatant commander and his staff must conduct extensive interagency coordination to ensure the full support of these efforts. The ability of USPACOM to coordinate and implement a comprehensive military diplomacy program begins with a robust staff. Similar to the GHQ/SCAP structure, USPACOM includes traditional, military staff functions, as well as special staff sections representing capabilities associated with select departments within the executive branch. The standard, joint staff functions include the J-1 through J-8.⁸⁵ In addition to these staff functions, the USPACOM Special Staff includes elements to advise the combatant commander on issues of foreign policy, public diplomacy, information, economics, and legislative affairs. This combination of traditional and special staff provides a body of expertise capable of planning, resourcing, and coordinating programs affecting all aspects related to military diplomacy.

The combatant commander's key enabler concerning the coordination of military diplomacy activities with the Department of State is the Foreign Policy Adviser. Serving as the "intermediary and focal point for USPACOM's interaction with the Department of State" the foreign policy adviser, "maintains extensive contacts to ensure USPACOM's views on important political/military trends in Asia/Pacific receive due consideration in interagency policy deliberations."⁸⁶ The Foreign Policy Advisor facilitates a cooperative relationship with State Department policy makers, much as General MacArthur's staff maintained a relationship with George Kennan's policy planning staff. This is a vital function in USPACOM coordination

⁸⁵ The traditional USAPCOM staff functions include J1 (Manpower, Personnel, Administration), J2 (Intelligence), J3 (Operations), J4 (Logistics and Security Assistance), J5 (Planning and Policy), J6 (Command, Control, Communications, Computer Systems), J7 (Exercises), J8 (Forces, Resources, Assessment).

⁸⁶ United States Pacific Command. *Office of the Foreign Policy Adviser* (USPACOM website, accessed 29 January 2006); available from <http://www.pacom.mil/staff/fpa/mission.shtml>.

efforts, mitigating the possibility of interagency disputes concerning the use of military diplomacy as a tool for the implementation of foreign policy.

Essential to the interagency coordination requirements at the theater strategic and operational levels, again is the USAPCOM Special Staff, as well as two other uniquely capable entities. These are the Defense Attaché Office (DATT) and the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG). Each of these entities plays a critical role in coordinating military diplomacy efforts across the region and within a given country. The Special Staff contributes expertise in a particular field, as well as a familiarity with embassy personnel and procedures critical to facilitating coordination. The JUSMAG is the designated representative of the Commander, USPACOM, acting as the primary interface between the embassy and host nation military of a particular country. The DATT provides a unique conduit for all parties involved, answering to Department of Defense at the strategic level, the Combatant Commander at the theater strategic level, and the ambassador at the operational level. Understanding each of these roles highlights the breadth of coordination conducted by USPACOM to ensure the success of military diplomacy efforts.

The Special Staff plays a key role in the interagency coordination process. Interacting with the “55 embassies and diplomatic posts in the region”, the special staff ensures “that the military objectives are in harmony with U.S. political goals and recommends steps to strengthen political-military ties with allies and friends in the region.”⁸⁷ The Special staff, structured to mirror the embassies country team, interfaces on behalf of the combatant commander in their particular area of expertise. This personal coordination amongst staffers at both headquarters

⁸⁷ Ibid.

contributes significantly to nurturing an environment of cooperation, essential to effectively conducting the full range of diplomatic activities.⁸⁸

The Commander, JUSMAG is the USPACOM representative to a particular country. The JUSMAG organization functions as the United States Security Assistance Office responsible for oversight of foreign military financing, foreign military sales, excess defense articles, etc.⁸⁹ In addition to administering security assistance functions, the JUSMAG has “responsibility for administering... non-security assistance missions. These include Joint Combined Bilateral Exercise Programs, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program...as well as coordination of joint... military to military engagement programs.”⁹⁰ JUSMAG achieves these functions by serving a dual chain of responsibility. As identified, Commander, JUSMAG represents USPACOM within a given country, but also has reporting responsibilities to the United States ambassador. JUSMAG provides the Commander, USPACOM a direct means of influencing a particular environment on a daily basis.

The DATT also performs several critical functions that support the Department of Defense, USPACOM, and the U.S. Ambassador. The four primary functions include advising the ambassador on military related issues, representing the Department of Defense to host nations, reporting conditions in the host nation to multiple agencies, and managing security cooperation programs.⁹¹ The DATT, advising the ambassador on projected, planned, and on-going military activities promotes the cooperation and support of the ambassador in facilitating these programs. Representing the Department of Defense and the combatant commander, the DATT provides a

⁸⁸ Embassy country teams are representative of the individual departments within the executive branch of government to include military, economic, informational, political and public affairs representatives.

⁸⁹ Embassy of the United States in Manila. *Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group Philippines: Commander Pacific Command Representative*. (USEMB Manila webpage, accessed 2 February 2006); available from <http://usembassy.state.gov/posts/rp1/wwwinde.htm>.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Shea, Timothy. *Transforming Military Diplomacy*. Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue Thirty-Eight, (2005), 51-52.

means of face-to-face communications with the host-nation on a day-to-day basis. Reporting conditions within the host-nation assist the combatant commander in prioritizing security assistance programs to match the countries needs.⁹²

Aligned with a particular country, the JUSMAG and DATT organizations are relatively small, but vital elements in the USPACOM structure. These programs straddle multiple lines of responsibility across the Department of Defense, USPACOM and the ambassadorial chain of command. The unique functions of the JUSMAG and DATT highlight the tremendous efforts undertaken to enhance the effectiveness of military diplomacy programs. The JUSMAG and DATT provide the access and influence within the interagency process, as well as within the respective country, required to implement military diplomacy programs effectively.

THE COMBATANT COMMANDER - CHIEF DIPLOMAT OF THE PACIFIC

The USPACOM Commander is directly responsible for two aspects of the military diplomacy program. The first responsibility is common to any military operation, the responsibility to direct, supervise, and guide the development, sourcing and execution of theater engagement activities implemented in support of military diplomacy. The second responsibility entails performing duties as a senior diplomat of the United States government. Commanding a region that includes the world's six largest armed forces, five of the United States' seven mutual defense treaties and numerous partners in the Global War on Terror, these diplomatic efforts assume an extraordinary significance.⁹³ This section focuses on the individual, diplomatic activities associated with the commander, relying on examination of the current Commander, USPACOM, Admiral William Fallon's travel itinerary and activities.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ United States Pacific Command. *PACOM Facts (USPACOM webpage, accessed 29 January 2006)*; available from <http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml>.

It is difficult to overstate the importance of the military diplomacy program developed specifically for the combatant commander, particularly in the Asia-Pacific Theater. The commander's personal engagement program requires a deft ability to engage the regions civil and military leadership across a range of topics. For instance, from 9-17 April 2005, Admiral Fallon's travels included stops to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and India.⁹⁴ The intent of the trip was the promotion of regional stability and security, covering topics ranging from humanitarian relief efforts to countering terrorist activities to expanding a strategic level partnership.

In Sri Lanka, Admiral Fallon met with the Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, as well as senior military commanders. The discussions in Sri Lanka centered on "post-tsunami reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts."⁹⁵ Viewed by the local and regional media as a demonstration of support for Sri Lanka's government, the visit by Admiral Fallon reinforced the United States commitment to promoting democracy and stability in Sri Lanka.⁹⁶

Admiral Fallon's engagement with India is of great significance for multiple reasons. First, Admiral Fallon conducted discussions and negotiations with Indian civil and military leaders in support of strategic initiatives announced by Secretary of State Rice. As reported, "The senior US defense official's visit assumes significance in the wake of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's recent announcement of developing a strategic partnership with India on a global level and easing transfer of high technology weapon systems to India."⁹⁷ Part of Admiral Fallon's discussions included the establishment of an exchange position for Indian Naval Officer's on the USPACOM staff. Beyond this formal act of military diplomacy, such visits

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Virtual Information Center. *Special Press Summary: Admiral Fallon Visits South Asia* [on-line journal, accessed February 2006]; available from <http://www.vic-info.org/RegionsTop.nsf/0/c69f763711f3e3880a256feb001003c4?>

⁹⁶ The local and regional view is based media coverage of Admiral Fallon's visit to Sri Lanka. Primary source is the (Asian Tribune, accessed February 2006); available from <http://www.asiantribune.com/shownews.php?id=14061>.

⁹⁷ Press Trust of India. *Top US Defense Official In India For Talks* [on-line journal]; available from <http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181.htm>; accessed February 2006.

afford Admiral Fallon the opportunity to establish personal relationships with Indian governmental and military leaders. Such relationships create avenues of immeasurable influence when dealing with strategically important partners, such as India.

The final engagement of this South Asia trip was a stop in Bangladesh. This stop focused on the United States efforts in the Global War on Terror. Meeting with Bangladeshi Foreign Minister, M. Morshed Khan, Admiral Fallon forwarded United States concerns over potential terrorist activities emanating from within the borders of Bangladesh, offering technical assistance to support counter-terrorism activities. Admiral Fallon summarizes this position in comments offered to reporters, stating, “Bangladesh could utilize US experience and expertise and technology in combating terror groups.”⁹⁸

These three engagements represent only a minute portion of the formal and informal diplomatic activities conducted by Admiral Fallon each year. Investing in such an extensive program of diplomacy pays enormous dividends in the capital of regional influence. Such efforts on the part of USPACOM establish the military commander as a figure with great personal and professional influence, both militarily and diplomatically. Such stature places the contemporary combatant commander in the realm achieved by General MacArthur in the Asia-Pacific of post World War II. With this influence is an expectation that Admiral Fallon and the United States military will uphold regional commitments. Only with a robust organizational structure and immense resources can Admiral Fallon achieve a comprehensive program of military diplomacy to follow through on the multitude of regional commitments.

OPERATIONALIZING MILITARY DIPLOMACY

Though the PACOM Commander plays an invaluable role in the promotion of foreign policy via diplomacy, subordinate organizations and headquarters carry out the day-to-day

⁹⁸ Reuters. *Music to India: U.S. Wants to Crush Bangladesh Terror* [on-line journal]; available from <http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=45127>; accessed February 2006.

activities of military diplomacy within the USPACOM structure. Specialized organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance contribute to the military diplomacy program by offering a university style forum to facilitate discussion, learning, and understanding in the respective areas of emphasis. The military service component commands, representing the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Special Forces provide the manpower, resources, and expertise required to perform military-to-military conferences, exercises and exchanges. Forward deployed elements such as Joint U.S. Military Assistance Groups (JUSMAG) and Defense Attaché organizations perform coordination and liaison functions essential to the implementation of the variety of programs carried in the Pacific Theater. The array of activities performed by these organizations illustrates the tremendous breadth and depth of the USPACOM military diplomacy program.

Established in Honolulu, Hawaii on 4 September 1995, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) provides “a forum where current and future military and civilian leaders from Asia-Pacific nations gather to enhance security cooperation through programs of executive education, professional exchange, and policy-relevant research.”⁹⁹ This forum allows participants to examine the “complex interrelationships of military, economic, political and diplomatic policies relevant to regional security issues.”¹⁰⁰ Staffed by an international group of civilian professors, active duty military, and contracted subject matter experts, this USPACOM institute offers a “world-class” educational environment. Perhaps as important as the formal functions of the center are the aspects of public diplomacy embedded in the program. The interchange of ideas, the cultural exposure and the professional and personal relationships

⁹⁹ Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. *APCSS Mission Statement*. (APCSS webpage, accessed 27 November 2005); available from <http://www.apcss.org>.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

developed amongst these senior leaders are indispensable assets to successful cooperation across the region.

The Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (DMHA), also headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii, performs the function of improving multi-lateral cooperation in response to humanitarian crisis throughout the Asia-Pacific. Focusing on civil-military relations, interagency cooperation and public health issues, DMHA pulls together leaders from numerous countries, organizations, and professions in order to enhance “effective civil-military management in international humanitarian assistance, disaster response and peacekeeping.”¹⁰¹ Similar to the APCSS, the Center of Excellence for DMHA promotes multi-lateral cooperation “through education, training, research and information management activities... in a multidisciplinary setting.”¹⁰²

As for the military service component commands, the contributions of manpower, resources, and expertise to military diplomacy programs are immeasurable. An examination of engagement activities conducted by the United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC) alone provides a representative example of these contributions. USARPAC activities include multilateral conferences, reciprocal visits, joint-combined training, small unit training, staff information exchanges, individual training, and the Disaster Preparedness Mitigation Assessment Program (DPMA). Each of these activities plays a significant role in the comprehensive military diplomacy program implemented by USPACOM.

Of primary importance to the USARPAC engagement program is the annual Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) conference. This conference is “a multinational military seminar providing a forum for senior-level (lieutenant colonel to major general, or national equivalent) officers from regional ground forces to exchange views. Not only a forum to further

¹⁰¹ Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. (Webpage, accessed 27 January 2006); available from <http://www.coe-dmha.org/faqs.htm>.

¹⁰² Ibid.

understanding of subjects studied, but also an opportunity to establish and enhance a set of strong interpersonal relationships among the future leaders of regional armies.”¹⁰³ The discussion, negotiations, and agreements made at this forum are the cornerstone of future cooperation across a breadth of issues, as well as setting the agenda for the ensuing year’s activities.

Reciprocal visits often follow such conferences to “focus on bilateral Army policy issues and positions, the review of ongoing activities, and consideration of new initiatives, and result in guidance and approval for the conduct of specific combined activities.”¹⁰⁴ These bilateral visits, conducted by general officer’s, senior staff members, and technical specialists are key components in transitioning military diplomacy from concept to action. Additionally, the very nature of reciprocal visits expands the base of personal and professional relationships necessary for influencing the operating environment effectively.

One outcome of the reciprocal visit process is the execution of joint, combined training exercises. The joint, combined training program promotes the interaction of U.S. military leaders with foreign civil and military leaders, foreign soldiers, and local civilians throughout the course of an exercise. Conducting thirty-five such exercises annually, the officers and soldiers of USARPAC represent the United States militarily, diplomatically, and culturally during the countless engagements across the Asia-Pacific.¹⁰⁵

Enhancing the effects associated with large scale joint, combined training is the staff information, small unit, and individual training and exchange programs. These smaller scale activities offer unique opportunities for participants to gain a more in-dept understanding of the military, culture, and people of the particular country visited. Programs such as the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) allow officers to live and work in foreign environments for up to two

¹⁰³ United States Army, Pacific. *Pacific Armies Management Seminar/ Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference* (USARPAC webpage, accessed October 2005); available from [http:// www2.apan-info.net/pams/default.htm](http://www2.apan-info.net/pams/default.htm).

¹⁰⁴ United States Army, Pacific. *Theater Security Cooperation Program* (USARPAC webpage, accessed October 2005); available from <http://www.usarapc.army.mil/tscp.asp>.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

years.¹⁰⁶ Intended to “establish relationships with personnel of other nations, foster understanding, encourage mutual confidence and respect, and provide interesting, and challenging duty”¹⁰⁷, these programs result in life-long personal and professional relationships, creating unparalleled access and influence.¹⁰⁸

The final program of discussion concerning component command activities is that of the Disaster Preparedness Mitigation Assessment Program (DPMA). As stated, “The program establishes/reinforces professional contacts and working relationships between; the U.S. Military, U.S. Foreign Service, U.S. Governmental Organizations, Host Nation/Territorial Government leaders, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), Private Volunteer Organizations (PVO), and International Organizations (IO).”¹⁰⁹ Intent on maximizing the disaster preparedness and response capabilities of the nations of the Asia-Pacific, DPMA assesses trains, advises and assist foreign governments and organizations. Quite clearly, this institution represents many of the issues related to military diplomacy. DPMA attempts to overcome issues of interagency coordination, coalition development, and bureaucratic obstacles to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy objectives through effective action.

In total, the activities of the military component commands contribute unparalleled benefits to the achievement of the USPACOM foreign engagement via the activities of military diplomacy. USARPAC represents only a fraction of the activities conducted by the five component commands over the course of a year. An exhaustive account of those activities requires volumes of work to do justice to benefits accrued from these vast efforts.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ The authors first and second-hand experiences provide the basis for the stated assessment of these programs.

¹⁰⁹ United States Army, Pacific. *Theater Security Cooperation Program* (USARPAC webpage, accessed October 2005); available from <http://www.usarapc.army.mil/tscp.asp>.

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

USPACOM's military diplomacy revolves around a theater engagement program developed across a wide range of activities. Included in these activities are the personal diplomacy efforts of the USPACOM Commander, foreign military assistance programs, international military education training, and numerous bi-lateral and multi-lateral exchanges and conferences. The resources and capabilities required to carry out such an expansive military diplomacy program include a robust staff organization, fully integrated component commands, and a network of military personnel embedded into the mechanisms of State Department diplomacy.

The USPACOM staff provides the planning and oversight necessary to coordinate these vast programs. Component commands provide the manpower and expertise to execute the programs. The Defense Attaché program and Joint United States Military Assistance Groups play an essential role in maximizing the full range of activities by providing access and the influence within the given country in which they operate. This combination of personal influence, immense resources and capabilities, and extensive access sets the stage for the theater strategic military diplomacy program.

With tremendous professional and personal stature, and control of immense resources and capabilities, contemporary combatant commanders influence, support, and in some cases directly participate in the full spectrum of foreign policy activities. Shaped by both a formal and informal processes of foreign policy development and guidance, the Commander, United States Pacific Command implements a comprehensive program of military diplomacy. The intent of this program is to facilitate and/or achieve strategic and theater strategic foreign policy objectives through means of engagement.

From a purely coordination standpoint, USPACOM is adequately postured to interface at the strategic level, with the Department of State, and at the operational level, with the fifty-five

U.S. embassies and diplomatic posts. Three primary organizations facilitate the coordination required to execute the military diplomacy program conducted across the Asia-Pacific region. The Commander, USPACOM's special staff provides an effective conduit to the Department of State at both the strategic and operational levels. Working within the formal channels, through professional contacts, and exploiting personal relationships, the special staff provides an interagency perspective otherwise lacking in military organizations.

The DAO and JUSMAG straddle a chain of responsibility that involves the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Combatant Commander, and the Ambassador. This dual chain-of-responsibility allows these organizations to assist the combatant commander in implementing the programs of engagement targeted for a particular country. It also fosters a sense of interagency cooperation by creating a requirement to advise the ambassador on the military activities programmed, planned, and on going within his country of responsibility. The functions of these two organizations provide the access and influence required to plan, coordinate and execute military diplomacy activities.

Despite interagency shortcomings at the highest levels of government, the coordination of USPACOM's military diplomacy program remains relatively effective. Key to this effectiveness is the theater strategic level activities that act as conduits of information and coordination at both the strategic and operational levels. Ensuring that activities encroaching across authoritative responsibilities are surfaced, vetted, and coordinated precludes the potential for interagency turf battles. Immense resident expertise, a robust staff, and uniquely tailored and aligned organizations provide an interagency coordination capability critical to the success of military diplomacy across the theater.

Sponsoring institutions such as the APCSS and the Center of Excellence for DMHA facilitates USPACOM formal efforts to engage beyond purely defense related activities. Establishing an environment of intellectual stimulation and educational structure promotes the

open dialogue and cooperation key to all diplomatic efforts. The very activities of these institutes encompass the spirit of diplomacy.

Of unquestionable significance are the peacetime activities carried out by uniformed military formations under USPACOM authority. Participating in multilateral conferences and seminars, conducting combined training and exercises, providing technical and material assistance, and exchanging personnel and ideas, the military component commands play a significant role in implementing the USPACOM diplomatic engagement plan. The immense capabilities and resources commanded by USPACOM establish the military as an essential player in not only the realm of defense related activities, but also the realm of diplomacy in the theater strategic environment.

CHAPTER SEVEN

MONOGRAPH CONCLUSION

Throughout history, many of the great names associated with warfare understood the far-reaching impacts of the military beyond pure violence and destruction. A study of the military theory and practice of these individuals clearly reveals not only a capability by the military to operate beyond the realm of pure warfare, but also a need to aptly apply these capabilities across the spectrum of national power. Sun Tzu builds the foundation by relating the unavoidable effects of the military on activities outside the framework of violent warfare. Frederick forwards the notion that military leaders must conduct diplomatically related activities in peacetime in order to fully understand and shape the environment prior to implementing any wartime action. Clausewitz takes the next evolutionary step by identifying the close relationship of policy and the power of the military. Based on this relationship, Clausewitz proposes the need for military leaders to be both soldier and statesman in order succeed fully. Finally, Alfred Thayer Mahan

transforms these ideas into a theory of sea power predicated on the ability of the United States to achieve the full spectrum of foreign policy objectives using maritime military diplomacy.

Putting the thoughts and practices of these great minds to use, the United States emerged onto the global stage, utilizing the military as a powerful, diplomatic tool in the pursuit of U.S foreign policy goals. The cruise of the Great White Fleet illustrates the earliest efforts of the United States to expand its regional and global influence through military diplomacy. Dependent on diplomatically perceptive officers, such as Admiral Sperry, President Roosevelt launched the United States on a round the world cruise to favorably shape the global environment. These efforts set the conditions required for the expansion of the United States as an economic and military power over the next several decades.

The role of the military perhaps reached its pinnacle during and immediately following World War II. The massive build up of forces, the staggering resources commanded by the military, and the expert and reverent power wielded by the military commanders placed this institution in a position of tremendous influence. Capitalizing on this position, the United States further empowered military leaders, such as General Douglas MacArthur, to facilitate post-war reconstruction efforts. General MacArthur, the GHQ/SCAP and the immense resources available to this command equated to a powerful, effective means of successfully achieving foreign policy goals using military diplomacy. General MacArthur's organization demonstrates the potential of an empowered military commander and a fully integrated staff to coordinate and implement foreign policy through means of military diplomacy.

Decades of debate and legislation followed World War II in an effort to capture the grandeur achieved by entities such as General MacArthur's unified command in Japan. The ensuing evolution transformed the military from the proconsul era of post World War II to the contemporary era of the regional combatant command. The United States Pacific Command represents the 21st century personification of General MacArthur's GHQ/SCAP of post World War II. This incarnate organization balances the demands of democratic society for civilian

oversight, with the autonomy to implement military diplomacy programs aimed at achieving the foreign policy goals established by this country's leaders.

Key to this balance is the theater strategic coordination efforts undertaken to mitigate potential points of friction associated with military diplomacy programs. USPACOM's coordination efforts establish a thread of continuity that promotes synchronization of foreign policy throughout the region. Acting as a conduit of information to both the strategic and operational levels, USPACOM ensures that activities encroaching across authoritative responsibilities are surfaced, vetted, and coordinated to preclude the potential for interagency turf battles. Immense resident expertise, a robust staff, and uniquely tailored and aligned organizations provide an interagency coordination capability unparalleled anywhere in the government. Attributes such as this are critical to the successful implementation of military diplomacy across the theater.

In conclusion, the monograph finds that not only does United States Pacific Command conduct diplomacy, but also that military diplomacy plays an essential role in U.S. diplomatic efforts at the theater strategic level. Currying tremendous international influence, controlling enormous resources, and capable of quickly executing a wide variety of missions, the combatant command provides an invaluable means of exporting United States foreign policy, through the use of force in times war and the use of military diplomacy in times of peace. As a foreign policy tool, the combatant command possesses expertise, resources and capabilities that no other department or agency within the United States government can bring to bear. Aligned and organized specifically for a designated geographic region, the combatant command structure provides an unparalleled capability to develop, orchestrate and execute a comprehensive, theater strategic level diplomacy program.

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